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COMMENTS
REFLECTIONS ON WILLFUL, WANTON, RECKLESS, AND GROSS
NEGLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
The terms "willful," "wanton," "reckless," and "gross negligence"
are all frequently used in the law to describe certain types of conduct,
but it is difficult to articulate clearly what those types of conduct are.
Sometimes these words are given the same meaning and are grouped
under a single "recklessness" classification,' while at other times they
are treated as though they refer to separate standards of conduct. 2 One
court, dismayed over the difficulty involved in the interpretation and
application of these terms, has aptly observed that they do little more
than to establish a "twilight zone which exists somewhere between
ordinary negligence and intentional injury." 3 Nevertheless, lawmakers
nationwide appear content to live in this "twilight zone," for they
continue to use these terms despite their vagueness. The Louisiana Leg-
islature, no exception to this general rule, has in several recent .pieces
of legislation used various combinations of the terms "willful," "wanton,"
"reckless," and "gross negligence" to define standards applicable to
exceptions to tort immunity statutes, 4 to solidary liability,5 and to the
award of exemplary damages.6
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1. Throughout this comment, the term "reckless" is used as an equivalent of the
words "willful," "wanton," "reckless," and "grossly negligent." This scheme is utilized
by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965). The comments to § 500 indicate that
"wanton" and "willful" are included in the "recklessness" category, and courts have
indicated that "gross negligence" is also included. See, e.g., Williamson v. McKenna,
223 Or. 366, 345 P.2d 56, 66 (1960).
2. W. Prosser and W. Page Keeton, The Law of Torts § 34 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Prosser and Keeton].
3. Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 714, 325 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1985).
4. Several Louisiana statutes now provide tort immunity for several classes of persons
and institutions. These statutes include La. R.S. 9:2792-2792.4 (Supp. 1988) (all protecting
board members of non-profit organizations); La. R.S. 9:2793 (Supp. 1988) (protecting
providers of gratuitous emergency care); La. R.S. 9:2791 (1965) (protecting landowners
allowing access to their land for recreational purposes); La. R.S. 9:2795 (Supp. 1988)
(protecting organizers and members of Mardi Gras parades); La. R.S. 9:2800.4 (Supp.
1988) (protecting owners of farms and forests from liability for injuries suffered by
trespassers); La. R.S. 9:2798 (Supp. 1988) (protecting volunteer athletic coaches and
physicians); La. R.S. 9:2798.1 (Supp. 1988) (protecting discretionary acts of public entities
or officers); and La. R.S. 9:2800 (Supp. 1988) (protecting public bodies).
5. La. Civ. Code art. 2324.
6. La. Civ. Code arts. 2315.3 and 2315.4.
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In all three types of statutes, the legislature has chosen various
combinations of these terms for the apparent purpose of establishing a
standard of care of a degree higher than ordinary negligence. Beyond
this, however, it is not at all clear what significance, if any, the legislature
intended that the courts should attach to these terms. Because the statutes
contain assorted combinations of these terms, in each of which the terms
are separated by different conjunctives and disjunctives, it is arguable
that the legislature meant to create a different standard in each statute,
with each term representing a distinct "level" of conduct. There are,
however, other possibilities. Perhaps the legislature intended to draw
upon the traditional common law interpretation of these terms, an
interpretation that places primary reliance upon the actor's consciousness 7
in determining whether conduct falls into such categories as "willful,"
"wanton," or "reckless." ' Still another possibility, of course, is that
the legislature employed these terms in the various statutes somewhat
indiscriminately and without careful consideration of their meaning or
of the ambiguities to which they inevitably give rise. At any rate, the
legislature clearly has provided the courts with only minimal guidance
in the difficult task of interpreting this new statutory language.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the problem of how Louis-
iana's courts should interpret these statutes. As an initial step in this
exploration, it will be necessary to consider briefly the language within
the statutes that has resulted, and will continue to result, in the problems
of interpretation. This will be done in section one. In section two,
various sources that might provide some assistance in developing an
appropriate interpretative approach to these statutes will be examined.
These sources include the scant Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting these
statutes, other statutes outside the realm of tort law that employ similar
language, and the common law approach to the analysis of such lan-
guage. Section three will propose a framework on the basis of which
the courts might interpret the statutes and, therefore, identify conduct
that satisfies the various legislative classifications. In the final section,
this proposed framework will be applied to each of the three types of
statutes at issue.
7. "Consciousness" of the danger that the actor has placed the injured party in
danger of is a convenient fixture for courts to use when assessing "reckless" conduct.
"Gross negligence" in theory does not reach this point, differing from negligence only
in "degree." For a thoughtful opinion examining this practice, see Williamson v. McKenna,
232 Or. 366, 345 P.2d 56 (1960).
8. As will be shown below, however, the common law interpretation of these words
is of little help, for the suggested differences between the terms generally are only semantic.
Prosser and Keeton define "willful, wanton, and reckless," "according to taste as to the
word used," and later provide that the willfulness in "willful" should be given only "lip
service." Prosser and Keeton, supra note 2, § 34, at 213.
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INTO THE TWILIGHT ZONE: STATUTORY LANGUAGE LEADING TO
CONFUSION
Until recently, such terms as "willful," "wanton," and "reckless"
were unknown to Louisiana's tort law. 9 However, beginning with the
enactment of certain tort immunity statutes, that situation changed dra-
matically. Generally speaking, an immunity statute relieves the tort li-
ability burdens of some selected individual, group, or institution by
lowering the level of care that must be exercised. Thus, liability lies
only if the tortfeasor's conduct is great enough to meet the particular
language set forth in the statute. Examples of such language drawn
from Louisiana's immunity statutes include "intentional act or gross
negligence,"' 10 "willful or malicious failure to warn,"" and "willful or
wanton" misconduct. 12
A few years after the advent of the immunity statutes, the legislature
again turned to the terms "reckless" and "wanton" to describe conduct
9. "The common-law distinctions between willful acts resulting in injury and simple
negligence are not recognized in the Civil Law, which requires only acts constituting 'fault'
to give rise to a cause of action." Moses v. Butts, 70 So. 2d 203, 206 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1954). See Comment, Rights and Duties of Riders in Private Automobiles, 22 La.
L. Rev. 474 (1962). Savoie v. Walker, 183 So. 530, 533 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938) provides
that "[tihis fault that causes the damage, or accompanies the act causing the damage,
may be deliberate, willful and intentional (in which case it may be a criminal offense)
or it may be an act arising from mere negligence." The breach of the duty owed to
trespassers has traditionally been considered "willful, wanton, and reckless" conduct, both
in Louisiana and at common law. An analysis that emphasizes the "status" of the injured
party has been judicially dismissed on the ground that a duty to exercise reasonable care
is owed to all people. The status of the individual, however, is still a relevant factor,
and it is often considered. See, e.g., Cates v. Beauregard, 328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S. Ct. 97 (1976).
Plaintiffs have frequently alleged "gross negligence" in their complaints even though
the exclusive delictual remedy under Louisiana law has, until recently, been based upon
ordinary negligence. See La. Civ. Code art. 2315. Further, the phrase "gross negligence"
has occasionally crept into the opinions of Louisiana courts. In Prosser v. Crawford, 383
So. 2d 1363, 1364-65 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), for example, the trial court found that
the defendant's running of a stop sign was "gross negligence." On appeal the majority
stated that La. Civ. Code art. 2315 was sufficient, but a concurring opinion expressed
concern that the treatment of "inadvertence" in this case (the majority did not disturb
the "gross negligence" language of the trial court's ruling) would open the door to hold
"gross, willful, and wanton negligence" in all stop sign cases. This case demonstrates
both the reason why these standards are not used much and the fact that the terms
"gross, willful, and wanton" are interchangeable. But see Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Suezy,
77 So. 2d 110, 112 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954) (turning left without looking for cars passing
from behind is "gross negligence"); and Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 263 La. 199, 202,
267 So. 2d 714, 716 (1972) (failure to keep proper lookout constitutes "gross negligence").
10. La. R.S. 2800.4 (Supp. 1988). For similar language, see La. R.S. 9:2793 (Supp.
1988); La. R.S. 37:1735 (1988).
11. La. R.S. 9:2795 (Supp. 1988).
12. La. R.S. 9:2792.1 (Supp. 1988), 9:2792.2 (Supp. 1988), 40:1235 (Supp. 1988).
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that warrants the award of exemplary damages. Currently, such damages
are authorized in two (2) contexts. First, where an intoxicated driver,
acting with "wanton or reckless" disregard for others, causes injury,
exemplary damages may be assessed against him. 3 Second, exemplary
damages are appropriate where one handling hazardous or toxic subst-
ances acts in a "wanton or reckless" manner and causes injury to
another. 14
Still more recently, the legislature has employed such language in
describing the circumstances under which joint tortfeasors will be held
solidarily liable. Under this new legislation, which marked a sharp break
with the longstanding principles of Louisiana tort law concerning solidary
liability, there is, in effect, a "presumption" that joint tortfeasors will
be held jointly liable. There are two exceptions. First, when solidarity
is necessary for the plaintiff to recover fifty percent of his damages,
then the tortfeasors will be held solidarily liable to that extent. Second,
and more importantly for purposes of this paper, tortfeasors will be
held to full solidarity if their conduct is "intentional or willful."
As this brief survey of the three types of statutes in which such
terms as "wantonness" or "recklessness" appear reveals, the legislature's
use of those terms has been extensive. It also reveals that the legislature
has combined those terms in a multitude of different ways. Throughout
the statutes, the following combinations can be found:
"conspires ... to commit an intentional or willful act," 5
"intentional act or gross negligence, 1 6
"deliberate and willful or malicious injury,"' 7
"willful or malicious failure to warn," 8
"deliberate and wanton act or gross negligence, '" 9
"willful or wanton misconduct," 2
"wanton or reckless disregard,"
"reckless disregard.'"2
"gross negligence,' ' 23
13. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.4.
14. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.3.
15. La. Civ. Code art. 2324 (provides for full solidary liability for certain joint
tortfeasors).
16. La. R.S. 2800.4 (Supp. 1988). For similar language, see La. R.S. 9:2793 (Supp.
1988); La. R.S. 37:1735 (1988).
17. La. R.S. 9:2791 (1965).
18. La. R.S. 9:2795 (Supp. 1988).
19. La. R.S. 9:2796 (Supp. 1988).
20. La. R.S. 9:2792.1 (Supp. 1988), 9:2792.2 (Supp. 1988).
21. La. Civ. Code arts. 2315.3 and 2315.4.
22. La. R.S. 32:24 (1963).
23. La. R.S. 9:2798 (Supp. 1988)
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"criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous,
reckless, or flagrant misconduct,"1'
Linguistically, each of the eleven adjectives used in these statutes appears
to describe a distinct standard of conduct. By using every combination
of the words, fifty-five different standards could be defined, and by
using conjunctives and disjunctives the legislature could provide even
more.25
Upon making a superficial examination of the above list, one might
conclude that, by combining the troublesome terms "wanton," "reck-
less," and so forth, the legislature intended that each separate term
refer to a distinct type of conduct and therefore that each phrase establish
a different standard of care. Thus, each term would describe a separate
kind of tort and would be accompanied by its own unique "operative
principle" on the basis of which the conduct that satisfies the term
could be consistently identified. For at least two reasons, however, it
is doubtful that the legislature had such a scheme in mind.
First, it appears that the choice of words to describe the conduct
in each statute was not done as part of any preconceived plan or scheme
requiring that each adjective describe a different level of conduct. The
list of combinations found in this legislation instead exhibits the complete
absence of any scheme. The texts of several of the statutes lend further
support to this inference. Consider, for example, the statute that provides
immunity to landowners who open their lands for recreational use,
immunity that is lost only if there is "willful or malicious failure to
warn." The recreational activities covered under the statute include such
things as "ice skating, sledding, snow mobiling" and "snow skiing. ' 26
Given Louisiana's notoriously warm climate, it is doubtful whether such
activities could ever be conducted in this state. This fact suggests that
the legislative draftsmen of the statute were not particularly careful or
discerning in their selection of the activities that should be included in
the statute, but rather simply adopted wholesale the list of activities
found in a similar statute from some other state. The same inference
might be drawn regarding the draftsmen's use of the phrase "willful or
malicious failure to warn." If that inference is correct, then it is clear
that the legislature did not contemplate any subtle differences between
the terms used to describe landowner misconduct.
24. La. R.S. 9:2798.1 (Supp. 1988).
25. One Louisiana court's use of these terms is symptomatic of the resultant confusion.
In Lipscomb v. News Star Publishing Co., the court commented that a driver "acted
wantonly, willfully, and heedlessly, and that his negligence was of the grossest sort," and
his conduct would "certainly have been willful and deliberate." Lipscomb v. News Star
Publishing Corp., 5 So. 2d 41, 45 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941).
26. La. R.S. 9:2795 (Supp. 1988).
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Second, a;scheme under which each of the terms represents a dif-
ferent level of conduct is unworkable as a practical matter. There is an
operative principle which, when satisfied identifies "intentional" conduct,
and an operative principal which describes "negligence." Each inter-
mediate level of conduct requires. its own operative principle for it to
_receive any consistent treatment. But the difficulties that surround any
attempt to articulate an operative principle for "wantonness," "will-
fulness," "recklessness," and "gross negligence," even though there are
* an unlimited number of points on a line of unreasonable conduct which
might correspond to these operative principles, make these standards
impossible to apply. As one commentator has persuasively argued, "it
is not difficult to understand that there are such things as major or
minor departures from reasonable conduct; but the difficulty of ...
drawing satisfactory lines of demarcation, together with the unhappy
history, justifies the rejection of the distinctions in most situations.' '27
For example, if a multitude of levels was contemplated by these terms,
possibly the most effective description of them would be that "gross
negligence" is "gross," while "reckless" is very gross, "wanton" is
very very gross, and "willful" is even more gross, and so forth.28
That any scheme for neat division of tortious conduct is unworkable
is demonstrated by People v. Calvaresi.29 In that case, the Colorado
Supreme Court found the state's manslaughter statute unconstitutionally
vague. Manslaughter was defined in terms of a typical "conscious dis-
regard" standard, while the crime of criminal negligence was defined
as a "gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in the situation." 30 This is typical of the two levels of
conduct frequently recognized between ordinary negligence and inten-
tional torts: "gross negligence" and "willful and wanton," but the court
found that
the distinction between a gross deviation from, and a wanton
and willful disregard of, a standard of care is not sufficiently
27. Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 S. Cal. L. Rev. 91 (1932).
28. One colorful and perhaps accurate description of the distinctions among negligence,
gross negligence and recklessness was provided by Chief Justice Rugg. These categories,
he remarked, draw "distinctions among a fool, a damned fool, and a God-damned fool."
Harvard Law Record, April 16, 1959. W. Prosser, J. Wade, and V. Schwartz, Cases and
Materials on Torts 204 (7th ed. 1982). Another equally effective illustration is that "slight
negligence" means small or little negligence, while "gross negligence" means gross or
great negligence, "that is negligence in a very high degree." Hambler v. Steckley, 148
Neb. 283, 289, 27 N.W.2d 178, 181 (1947). Consider also this description: "wantonness
is a synonym for what is popularly known as cussedness." Universal Concrete Pipe Co.
v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 573, 200 N.E. 843, 845 (1936).
29. 108 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975).
30. Id. at 281, 534 P.2d at 318.
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apparent to be intelligently and uniformly applied. The legislative
attempt to distinguish between recklessness, and its purportedly
less culpable counterpart, criminal negligence, constitutes a dis-
tinction without a sufficiently pragmatic difference. To base a
conviction of a felony, rather than a misdemeanor, upon the
shifting sands of these semantics does not constitute substantial
justice.3
This case clearly demonstrates the problems inherent in the application
of levels of tortious conduct.
Because the legislature has taken words with no meaning and com-
bined them with other words that have no meaning, using conjunctives
and disjunctives to make the standards described even more cryptic, the
guidance that it has attempted to provide has instead tied the court's
shoes with Gordian knots. The task now facing the courts, as well as
commentators, is to develop some approach that will enable the former
to begin untying those knots.
THE SEARCH FOR A WAY OUT OF THE TWILIGHT ZONE: POSSIBLE
SOURCES OF GUIDANCE
In attempting to discover or to design an appropriate interpretative
framework for construing these statutes, the sensible place to start is
with what might be considered the standard or obvious sources of
interpretative guidance. These sources include both the limited Louisiana
jurisprudence that has interpreted and applied these statutes and other
Louisiana statutes, outside the realm of tort law, that use similar lan-
guage and which might provide insight into what meanings the legislature
associates with these terms. Furthermore, because such terms as "willful"
and "wanton" have received extensive treatment by courts in other
jurisdictions, jurisdictions that had statutes employing this language long
before Louisiana (automobile guest passenger statutes, for example), that
treatment should be considered as well.
Louisiana Authorities
Jurisprudence
Despite the fact that many of the statutes employing terms like
"willful" and "wanton" have been in place for several years, there
have been few cases in which courts have been called upon to analyze
those terms. The analysis provided in that handful of cases provides
31. Id. at 282, 534 P.2d at 318-19.
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the proper starting point for the interpretation of the statutory language
in question.
One set of cases concerns the meaning of the phrase "deliberate
and willful or malicious" as it is used in Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:2791,32 which provides limited tort immunity to landowners who allow
others access to their land for recreational purposes. Under this statute,
such landowners lose their immunity when, through "deliberate and
willful or malicious conduct," they injure persons permitted onto their
property. 3
The earliest of these decisions was Rushing v. State.3 4 A frog hunter
was killed when his twelve foot "frog catcher" made contact with an
uninsulated electric line that the state was responsible for maintaining.
In the trial court, the plaintiffs, survivors of the hunter, contended that
the conduct of the state was "deliberate and willful or malicious" and,
therefore, that the state lost any claim to immunity which it otherwise
might have enjoyed under the statute. The Rushing court split the
standard into two parts, concluding that the statute was satisfied if the
conduct was either (1) "deliberate and willful," or (2) "malicious." The
court, in attempting to articulate what these terms mean, concluded that
all three involve a "concept of some conscious design." 3 The court
cited with approval a source that defined "deliberate" as "[w]illful
rather than merely intentional.' '36 The court also cited a definition of
"malicious" as an act done "spitefully or wantonly." '3 7
In two later cases, other courts followed the Rushing court's inter-
pretation of the phrase "deliberate and willful or malicious." In LaCroix
v. State, Through Department of Transportation,"8 the court found that
the state was not guilty of "deliberate and willful or malicious" conduct
in failing to warn a diver of a known submerged hazard, even though
the state had "constructive notice" that the site was a popular swimming
hole. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that the term "willful"
necessarily involves a "conscious design" to injure, a proposition at-
32. La. R.S. 9:2791 (1965).
33. It would appear that this statute, like La. R.S. 9:2795, takes the standard of
care traditionally owed to trespassers and applies it to invitees and licensees as well. See,
e.g., Cates v. Beauregard, 316 So. 2d 907 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 328 So. 2d
367 (La. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S. Ct. 97 (1976).
34. 381 So. 2d 1250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
35. Id. at 1252-53.
36. Id. at 1252 (citing Cole v. List & Weatherly Const. Co., 156 So. 88, 90 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1934)).
37. Id. at 1253 (citing the fourth edition of Black's Law Dictionary's definition of
"malicious").
38. 477 So. 2d 1246 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 478 So. 2d 1237 (1985).
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tributed to the Rushing opinion.3 9 In the other case, Johnson v. Chicago
Mill & Lumber Co., 4° the court turned to the Rushing decision for
assistance in construing the term "willful" as used in a plaintiff's
worker's compensation claim. "Willful" conduct, the court concluded,
means the same thing as "intentional."4
Subsequently to the passage of the two exemplary damages statutes,
several courts have addressed the level Of culpability that is described
by "wanton or reckless," a phrase that appears in both statutes. The
fifth circuit in Levet v. Calais & Sons, Inc.42 assessed punitive damages
against an employer after an intoxicated employee's automobile accident.
It is not clear from the opinion whether this liability was based upon
vicarious liability, or on the employer's own conduct, where a supervisor
bought beer for the employee-driver even though the employee had
previously told this supervisor that he had almost fallen to sleep when
driving after long hours of work. 43 The court's interpretation of 2315.4
that would assess exemplary damages to the provider of the alcohol is
difficult to justify under a strict reading of the statute," but the case
also demonstrates the problems posed by the application of a "reck-
lessness" test. The supervisor was "conscious" of the risk he exposed
to others when he provided beer to a driver known to become tired
after long hours of work, therefore he "consciously disregarded" that
risk, and this behavior contributed to the accident, satisfying the cause
in fact element of the statute.'5
In Myres v. Nunsett," the second circuit was called upon to de-
termine whether a driver who had parked in a traveled portion of a
street was guilty of "wanton or reckless" conduct. The intoxicated driver
statute, Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4, includes a requirement that
the actor's intoxication be "a cause in fact of the resulting injuries,"
and the court avoided an analysis of the driver's culpability by finding
39. Id. at 1250-51.
40. 385 So. 2d 878 (La. App 2d Cir. 1980).
41. Id. at 880.
42. 514 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987).
43. Id. at 158.
44. Based upon the language of the statute the intoxicated person appears to be the
one who must have been "wanton or reckless." The court in Levet said that "[w]e find
Calais' liability was justified on the basis of its own culpable behavior, which we believe
contributed to this accident." Id. at 158. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.4 provides: "[E]xemplary
damages may be awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were
caused by a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others by a defendant
whose intoxication while operating a motor vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting
injuries."
45. 514 So. 2d at 158.
46. 511 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
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that this requirement had not been met. It has been said that an analysis
of causation should be a factual determination that "should be main-
tained utterly devoid of any policy overtones. ' 47 Under the "substantial
factor" test for cause in fact48 every consequence has innumerable causes,
so that an intoxicated driver who has parked illegally might not have
parked as dangerously had he not been intoxicated, so his intoxication
could arguably be considered a cause in fact. 49 A reliance upon cause
in fact allows courts to avoid an analysis of the actor's conduct, but
because cause in fact is usually easily satisfied and does not examine
relevant policies, it does not provide the court with much direction.
As this brief review of the cases arising under the immunity and
exemplary damages statutes reveals, these cases exhibit a complete lack
of meaningful analysis of the terms "willful," "wanton," and so forth.
They will therefore provide other courts with little guidance in the future
interpretation of these statutes.
Other Louisiana Statutes
The terms "willful," "wanton," reckless," and "gross negligence,"
or others very much like them, are found in two statutes outside the
realm of the tort law: Louisiana Civil Code article 3556(13) and Louisiana
Revised Statutes 14:12. These statutes and the jurisprudence interpreting
them will be examined in an effort to determine what guidance, if any,
they provide for understanding the troublesome terms at issue.
The definitional section of the Civil Code includes article 3556(13),
which refers to the degrees of fault: "gross, slight, and very slight."
The article defines "gross fault" as conduct that "[p]roceeds from
inexcusable negligence or ignorance; it is considered as nearly equal to
fraud." 0 This article is peculiar because, unlike other definitions in that
section of the code, no other articles utilize this language and therefore
require a definition. But Sullivan v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co." made reference to "gross fault" when defining the "reckless
disregard for the safety of others" standard utilized in the emergency
vehicle immunity statute.5 2 With language typical of the confusion that
accompanies these terms, the second circuit in Sullivan used "gross
47. Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself versus American Beverage Com-
pany, 30 La. L. Rev. 363, 371 (1970).
48. See, e.g., Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La.
471, 487, 137 So. 2d 298, 304 (1962).
49. Malone, supra note 47.
50. La. Civ. Code art. 3556(13).
51. 155 So. 2d 432 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), writ denied, 245 La. 64, 156 So. 2d
604 (1963).
52. La. R.S. 32:24 (1963).
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fault" to describe "reckless disregard," and then clarified what "gross
fault" involves with the statement that it "undoubtedly implies wanton
or willful negligence." '53
Criminal law legislation provides equally little guidance for courts
applying a statute that utilizes these problem words. But the treatment
of these terms by the criminal law at least suggests that courts should
not attempt to draw fine distinctions between the particular words used
in the statutes.
Criminal negligence is defined as the "gross deviation below the
standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man
under like circumstances." 54 The reporter's comment to that statute
indicates that the standard to be applied corresponds to the concept of
"gross negligence" in tort law, referring to the Restatement of the Law
of Torts § 500.15 Thus the Criminal Code provides that "gross negli-
gence" is a "disregard of consequences" or "recklessness." This statute
is meant to require conduct that "calls for substantially more than the
ordinary lack of care which may be the basis of tort liability and
furnishes a more explicit statement of that lack of care which has been
variously characterized in criminal statutes as 'gross negligence' and
'reckless.' ' 56 These statements could be limited to criminal law but there
are indications that the legislature has associated "gross negligence" with
this definition. The intentional act exception to workers' compensation
employee immunity originally read "intentional or by gross negligence,"
with the same "gross deviation" definition used in the criminal statute,
but the version that was passed provided only the "intentional act"
exception.5 7 Apparently, the legislators have assigned "gross negligence"
the same meaning as the Restatement's concept of "recklessness," which
includes gross negligence within its broad definition.58
53. 155 So. 2d at 436.
54. La. R.S. 14:12 (1986).
55. La. R.S. 14:12, reporter's comment (1986).
56. Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code: A Comparison With Prior Louisiana
Criminal Law, 5 La. L. Rev. 6, 11 (1942).
The definition of "Criminal Negligence" ... as requiring a "gross deviation
below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful
man under like circumstances" . . . calls for substantially more than the ordinary
lack of care which may be the basis of tort liability, and furnishes a more
explicit statement of that lack of care which has been variously characterized
in criminal statutes as "gross negligence" and "recklessness."
Id. at 11.
57. 1976 La. Acts No. 147, § 1, codified at La. R.S. 23:1032 (1985).
58. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1966).
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Common Law Authorities
Another source to which one might turn in attempting to develop
an appropriate interpretative approach to such terms as "willful" and
"wanton" is the jurisprudence of other jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions
have for many years used these terms in guest passenger statutes and
statutes authorizing punitive damages to define relevant standards of
care. Because the terms have seen little use in Louisiana, it is likely
that the Louisiana Legislature had this "common law" jurisprudence
in mind when it employed the terms "willful," "wanton," and so on
in the three types of statutes under consideration here. This creates
other problems because there appear to be as many different definitions
of these terms as there are statutes that use them. 9
Common law courts and commentators use "willful, wanton and
reckless" to describe a state of mind not present when an actor is merely
negligent. Prosser and Keeton state that the terms, "according to taste
as to the words used," describe the conduct of an actor who "has
intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of
a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable
that harm would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by
conscious indifference to the consequences. '" 60 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts provides a similar definition, defining "reckless disregard of
safety" as an act done "knowing or having reason to know of facts
which would lead a reasonable man to realize ... that such risk is
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent.' '61
"Gross negligence" is synonymous with "recklessness" in some
jurisdictions62 and is a distinct "level" of conduct in others,63 yet in
59. See Comment, Judicial Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S. Cal. L. Rev. 884,
889 (1968).
60. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 2, § 34, comment g at 213 (emphasis added).
61. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1966).
62. Many states distinguish the conduct as two "levels," but many do not, and define
"gross negligence" in terms of "recklessness." For example, Texas requires that the
conduct, defined as "gross negligence," exhibit "that entire want of care which would
raise the belief that the act or omission complained of was the result of a conscious
indifference to the right or welfare of the person or persons to be affected by it." Missouri
Pacific Railway Co. v. Shuford, 72 Tex. 165, 170, 10 S.W. 408, 411 (1888).
63. See Prosser and Keeton, supra note 2, § 34. Courts frequently use "degree" and
"kind" distinctions to split negligence into three "levels"- ordinary negligence, gross
negligence, (which differs from ordinary negligence only in degree) and "recklessness,"
which differs from both ordinary and gross negligence in "kind." "Gross negligence" is
sometimes equated with the "last clear chance" doctrine, while "recklessness" is conduct
that is more egregious. See, e.g., Thone v. Nicholson, 84 Mich. App. 538, 629 N.W.2d
665 (1978).
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many instances the differences are merely semantic. For instance, what
is frequently called "gross negligence" in one jurisdiction is actually the
equivalent of "recklessness" in another.M "Willful" misconduct repre-
sents a level of conduct more culpable than gross negligence in some
jurisdictions, but is assigned a meaning indistinguishable from intent,
while gross negligence is equated with "recklessness. '65
64. California has defined "willful misconduct" as the intentional doing of an act
with a wanton and reckless disregard of its consequences. Williams v. Carr, 68 Cal. 2d
579, 584, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309, 440 P.2d 505, 509 (1968). In other cases, California
courts have attempted to clarify this standard further by requiring proof of two "elements"
before conduct will be deemed "willful": (1) the actor intentionally does an act or fails
to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, (2) knowing or having reason to
know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize that the conduct not only
creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other, but also involves a high degree
of probability that substantial harm will result to him. In re Whitlatch, 60 Cal. App. 2d
189, 195, 140 P.2d 457, 461 (1943); People v. Young, 20 Cal. 2d 832, 836-37, 129 P.2d
353, 356 (1942). These "elements" are not too helpful, however, for all acts are "inten-
tional" under part (1) and part (2) merely describes a "negligence" analysis for conduct
that is highly unreasonable. In still another effort at clarifying these terms, a California
appellate court suggested that misconduct will be found "willful," as opposed to merely
"negligent," only if there is proof of (1) actual or constructive knowledge of the peril
to be apprehended, (2) actual or constructive knowledge that injury is a probable result
of the danger, and (3) a conscious failure to act to avoid such peril. Bains v. Western
Pac. Ry., 56 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905, 128 Cal. Rptr. 778, 779 (1976). "Wanton and
reckless misconduct" is present, one California court suggested, when a person "inten-
tionally performs an act which is so unreasonable and dangerous that he knows, or should
know, that it is highly probable that harm will result. Porter v. Hofman, 12 Cal. 2d
445, 448, 85 P.2d 447, 448 (1938). "Gross negligence" on the other hand has been defined
as the "want of care which would raise a presumption of the conscious indifference to
consequences," People v. Pfeiffer, 224 Cal. App. 2d 578, 580, 36 Cal. Rptr. 838, 839
(1964) (quoting People v. Costa, 40 Cal. 2d 160, 166, 250 P.2d 1, 5 (1953)), and as "the
exercise of so slight a degree of care as to justify a belief that there was an indifference
to the things and welfare of others ... rais[ing] a presumption of the conscious indifference
to consequences" and "a passive and indifferent attitude toward results." Amoruso v.
Carley, 93 Cal. App. 2d 422, 427, 209 P.2d 139, 142 (1949). The line between these
definitions seems to be a fine one, but the two "standards" have been used to determine
liability under California's guest passenger statute, which requires "willful" misconduct,
but is not satisfied by "gross negligence" or "wanton" misconduct. To compound this
confusion, the "imputation" of negligence is not possible for "willful" misconduct, but
it is for "gross negligence." Exemplary damages are available for "willful," and possibly
"wanton," conduct but not for "gross negligence." For a discussion of the effects of
these "different" standards, see Quint, A Quick Look: "Willful Misconduct," "Wanton
and Reckless Misconduct," "Gross Negligence," 40 Cal. St. B.J. 481 (1965).
65. For example, in Florida "gross or wanton negligence" is defined as an act which
"involves a clear and present danger, or an awareness or chargeable knowledge of that
act or omission in the face thereof which is likely to result in injury." Glaab v. Caudill,
236 So. 2d 180, 183-185 (Fla. 1970). "Willful or wanton misconduct," on the other hand,
requires that the actor have a "design, purpose, or intent to cause the injury." Boyce
v. Pi Kappa Alpha Holding Corp., 476 F.2d 447, 453 (5th Cir. 1973). Thus, though
Florida law appears to recognize two "levels" of "recklessness," those two (2) levels in
fact resemble "recklessness" and intent, respectively.
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Obviously the label given to the conduct gives rise to much confusion.
But despite the differences among the states regarding what courts and
legislatures call the conduct, all courts must identify it. This task is
accomplished by the use of a test that usually consists of several elements.
One court admitted to the difficulties inherent in the application of
these "tests," but conceded that it knew of no alternative:
[T]here is no magical verbal formula which will describe with
precision the difference between negligence and reckless conduct
... [, there [certainly] are differences in the gravity of the
fault and the fact that the difference cannot be precisely stated
should not preclude us from administering a scheme of liability
which is based upon the seriousness of the actor's misconduct. 66
The elements of these tests typically include (1) the actor's knowledge
of the risk, (2) the magnitude of the risk, and (3) whether the actor is
"conscious" of the risk he is exposing to others and therefore is "in-
different" to or acts in "conscious disregard" of the safety of others. 67
Although the tests were formulated to help courts identify requisite
conduct, they do little to guide the courts in practical application to
current disputes. The knowledge of the risk element is used in con-
junction with the "indifference" or "conscious disregard" element to
distinguish the more culpable state of mind that has been said to
accompany recklessness from ordinary negligence. Yet because the knowl-
edge is inferred from the conduct, and presumed to accompany highly
unreasonable conduct, the analysis is not of the actor's state of mind
at all but merely disguises the analysis that courts are really undertaking. 61
The second element, that the risk is great, likewise provides little guid-
ance. Language identifying this element commonly is that the risk is
"probable as opposed to possible," '69 or that there exists a "clear and
66. Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Or. 366, 394, 345 P.2d 56, 69 (1960).
67. See Annotation, Test of Criterion of Gross Negligence or Other Misconduct that
Will Support Recovery of Exemplary Damages for Bodily Injury or Death Unintentionally
Inflicted, 98 A.L.R. 267 (1935).
68. Some tests require "constructive" knowledge of the specific peril that should
have been avoided. DeElena v. Southern Pac. Co., 121 Ariz. 563, 592 P.2d 759 (1979);
see also Boyce v. Pi Kappa Alpha Holding Corp., 476 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1973). In
Pettingell v. Moede, 129 Ca. 484, 271 P.2d 1038 (1954), the court stated that knowledge
can be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances. The court in Williams v. Carr,
68 Cal. 2d 579, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305, 440 P.2d 505 (1968), stated that the knowledge can
either be express or implied. See also Harper, infra note 81, questioning the knowledge
requirement.
69. Thompson v. Bohlken, 312 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Ia. 1981); McLaughlin v. Rova
Farms Inc., 56 N.J. 288, 305, 266 A.2d 284, 293 (1970); Harzfeld's v. Otis Elevator, 116
F. Supp. 512, 514 (W.D. Mo. 1953). "Wanton" requires knowledge of "highly probable"
harm, while "reckless" requires only knowledge of an "unreasonable risk." Saaybe v.
Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 F. Supp. 65, 69 n.6 (Pa. 1977).
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present danger." 7 0 The final element is the actor's "conscious disregard"
of a risk or "indifference" to whether the injury occurs, which is meant
to distinguish "recklessness" from "intent" as well as from gross neg-
ligence. 7' This element is present where the actor uses no care at all,72
exercises only slight care, 73 or, in some cases, "fail[s] to discover the
danger through recklessness or carelessness when it could have been
discovered by the exercise of ordinary care. ''7
4
The actor's awareness of the risk should always be an important
consideration, but the tests appear to require this consciousness when
in fact the type of risk supplies the true focus. The actor's consciousness
could be satisfied by an actor who is actually aware of a great risk,
should have been aware of a great risk but was not, or merely was
negligent in failing to discover that it involved a great risk. These three
situations could be used to identify different levels of culpability, but
again the "greatness" of the risk remains the distinguishing feature.
Courts should find little guidance by distinguishing conduct based upon
an actor's not knowing when he "should have known" of a risk, rather
than not knowing when he was negligent in not discovering the risk.
The actor's awareness is an important factor only if he had actual
awareness of the risk, but if he did not appreciate the risk the analysis
then focuses on the degree of unreasonableness that the conduct rep-
resents. Yet even if the actor knew how unreasonable his conduct was,
courts must examine the degree of that risk to determine if the conduct
is sufficiently culpable to be called "reckless."
Because the courts apply an external and objective standard, the
nature of the conduct, which depends upon the quantum of unreason-
70. Glaab v. Caudill, 236 So. 2d 180, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
71. Typical of the language that courts use to describe "indifference" is the following:
"complete indifference and unconcern for probable consequences." Duckers v. Lynch,
204 Kan. 649, 653, 465 P.2d 945, 948 (1970). Other attempts to describe these terms
have done little better. Consider this famous characterization: the difference between
"recklessness" and "intent" is demonstrated by an actor who "casts a missile intending
that it shall strike another and him who casts it where he has reason to believe it will
strike another, being indifferent whether it does so or not." Gibbard v. Cursan, 225
Mich. 311, 320-21, 196 N.W. 398, 401 (1923). These cases appear to require a "wanton"
state of mind, yet "[allmost no cases face the question of what the jury should do if
they do not in fact draw that inference-if they find instead that defendant acted dan-
gerously enough but with well-meaning stupidity." Harper, infra note 81, § 16.15, at 522.
72. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Shuford, 72 Tex. 165, 10 S.W. 408 (Tex. 1888).
73. See Liston v. Reynolds, 69 Mont. 480, 223 P.2d 507 (1924) and O'Neil v. Henke,
167 Neb. 631, 94 N.W.2d 322 (1959). Gross negligence, defined as the "absence of slight
care," is the same as recklessness. Spikes, Gross Negligence Under Guest Statute, 22 Neb.
L. Rev. 264, 264 (1943).
74. Hocking v. Rehnquist, 44 Ill. 2d 196, 201, 254 N.E.2d 515, 518 (1969).
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ableness of the risk, determines the actors' culpability.75 It should not
make any difference whether the actor was "filled with anxious solicitude
... [or an] utter indifference to the probable danger to others. "76 At
least one court admitted to the reality of the "knowledge" standard,
as
[I]t was necessary to move up the scale of fault where there
could be found a distinguishing feature which could serve as a
point of division in describing serious culpability and which
could be used in testing the defendant's conduct in a particular
case. That feature was the defendant's mental state-the fault
that is associated with a consciousness of danger and an election
to encounter it."n
The court further provided that the actor's mental state is not in truth
a factor, but that it "seems to be enough to afford us with language
which can serve as a rally point for judgment.17
. The use of consciousness as a reference point disguises what courts
are in fact doing-making policy judgements under particular circum-
stances. It is analogous to the labels and buzz words which have made
proximate cause such an elusive concept and which when removed force
judges to do their jobs more effectively. 79 The analysis should be a
balancing of the same factors which made the conduct negligent, and
judges should be applauded for being overt in this analysis. The concern
is not that defendants will fail to satisfy the "consciousness" requirement
despite having exposed some highly unreasonable risk to others, for an
75. Consider this remark of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
[Tihe words malice, intent, and negligence refer to an external standard. If the
manifest probability of harm is very great, and harm follows, we say that it
is done maliciously or intentionally; if not so great, but still considerable, we
say that it is done negligently; if there is no apparent danger, we call it mischance.
Holmes, Collected Legal Papers at 117-18 (1920).
76. Harper, James and Gray, The Law of Torts, § 16.15, at 522 (2d ed. 1986).
77. Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Or. 366, 388, 345 P.2d 56, 66 (1960).
78. Id. at 67.
79. The use of "tests" to identify "reckless" conduct disguises the court's analysis
in the same way that vacuous "proximate cause" language has.
The most distinctive aspect of the duty-risk technique is the highlight it casts
upon the creative character of the decisionmaking process. The judge who resorts
to the technique becomes more aware of the wide breadth of the innovative
power he commands. This consciousness of the wide range of his discretion
proves extremely helpful to the judge whenever he undertakes to probe the
breadth of protection afforded by law. He soon realizes that he is largely out
on his own.
Malone, Some Ruminations on Contributory Negligence, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 91, 91-92
(1981).
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examination of caselaw reveals few such cases.A0 But by purporting to
rely upon consciousness, courts might call conduct "reckless" without
properly analyzing the risks posed by the actor.
The traditional approach to the identification of conduct sufficiently
culpable under both types of statutes seems to emphasize the actor's
consciousness as the source of the actor's culpability, yet courts are in
fact examining the conduct of the particular actor, regardless of his
state of mind. 1
A WAY OUT OF THE TWILIGHT ZONE: A PROPOSED INTERPRETATIVE
APPROACH
The Proposal
As the analysis undertaken in the previous section reveals, neither
the Louisiana statutes and jurisprudence nor the common law's treatment
of "recklessness" provides much guidance for one who is interested in
developing an intelligent interpretative approach to such terms as "will-
ful" and "wanton." That analysis does show, however, that courts
forced to interpret those terms will encounter two distinct problems.
The proposal presented here will address each of them. The first problem
is that although there are an unlimited number of "levels" of culpability,
there are no reference points to help courts distinguish these levels with
any consistency. Therefore, it would be preferable for courts to abandon
the effort to make such subtle distinctions and to consider the terms
"wanton," "reckless," and so on as interchangeable signals that the
contemplated conduct falls somewhere in the broad range which extends
from mere negligence to intentional torts. Second, the common law
approach to the interpretation. of the terms in question, which relies
heavily upon "conscious disregard," either directs analysis away from
those factors that should be of central concern-the nature of the actor's
conduct, evaluated in terms of the magnitude of the risk, the utility of
the conduct, and the cost of the avoidance-or masks, under barren
doctrinal discourse, a covert analysis of those factors. The courts, there-
fore, should abandon or suppress tests based upon consciousness and
instead engage in an overt analysis of the risk and utility associated
with the actor's conduct. Below, each element of this proposal will be
discussed in turn.
80. Harper, supra note 76, § 16.15, at 522.
81. There are few cases in which an actor who is not "conscious" but is doing some
highly unreasonable activity escapes liability under a "recklessness" theory because he
does not exhibit a "reckless" state of mind. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 76, § 16.15,
at 522.
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The first element of this proposal requires that courts and practi-
tioners accept that all tortious conduct can be placed on a scale of
unreasonableness, comprised of ordinary negligence, a middle tier of
recklessness, and intentional conduct. Intentional conduct includes actual
desire and presumed desire or that which is substantially certain to
result. Recklessness and ordinary negligence are located at the opposite
end of the spectrum from intent, far enough away that they can be
called a different kind of conduct, although really only different in
degree. Recklessness represents a broad zone along this spectrum from
conduct that is not substantially certain to result in specific consequences,
to ordinary negligence. The application of these statutes requires that
courts distinguish what is substantially certain from what is not, and
conduct that is ordinary negligence from what is more than ordinary
negligence. It is impossible to clearly define exactly what courts must
identify when making these determinations, but at least there are only
three levels that need to be distinguished. A statute that utilizes "wan-
ton" or "reckless" merely signals a reference to this middle tier. The
problems which face courts attempting to apply a "recklessness" statute
are eased if the courts realize that the legislature has indicated that
ordinary negligence is not sufficient under the particular statute, but
that some form of aggravated misconduct will be required, regardless
of the word assigned to it. All of the terms used in the statutes can
be placed into one of three broad "tiers" located along a "spectrum"
of unreasonable conduct:
"Intent Group": Terms in this category, which include "will-
ful" and "deliberate," should be assigned the same meaning as
"intentional."
"Reckless Group": This category represents that broad ranger
of tortious conduct that makes up the middle ground between
intentional tort and ordinary negligence. The terms that sould
be assigned to this group include "malicious," "reckless," "wan-
ton," and "gross negligence.''82
82. The difference between "recklessness" and "intent" is not difficult to articulate,
and because Louisiana has distinguished intentional torts for exclusion from workers'
compensation, in addition to intentional act exclusions in insurance contracts, the definition
provided is quite narrow, and modeled from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A
(1965) "intended or substantially certain" of the consequences of the act, and not intending
the act itself. See e.g., Bazely v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981) and Pique v. Saia,
450 So. 2d 654 (La. 1984), adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965). But
cf. Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389 (La. 1987), possibly broadening the scope of what
is meant by "intentional." Much of the confusion that surrounds descriptions of "reck-
lessness" stems from a requirement that the actor must "intend" to do the act, and
therefore has "intended" to breach the duty owed to the injured party, if the duty was
obvious enough that a court can "presume" that the actor "knew" of the duty. This
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"Negligence Group": This category designates conduct that
falls short of the standard duty of reasonable care. The only
terms included here is "negligence."
Once the language used in a statute can be identified as referring to
one of these broad tiers of unreasonable conduct, the particular statute
should be examined to provide additional guidance for movement up
or down within each level of conduct. The simplicity of a three "tiered"
scheme of conduct should provide courts the flexibility to overtly examine
the nature of the risk without relying upon a vacuous "should have
known" or "recklessly failed to discover" standard. The conduct rep-
resents a greater degree of unreasonableness based on the same inquiries
that courts use when determining if conduct represents ordinary negli-
gence. An actor who is guilty of ordinary negligence "should have
known" not to engage in the conduct, and a "reckless" actor had even
more reason to know. But because actual awareness is not required,
what he "should have known" should be determined by reference to
the same policy considerations as those that are applicable in a negligence
analysis.
If a reference to this middle tier has been made by a statute's use
of one of these "recklessness" terms, the court applying the statute
must then examine the actor's conduct instead of relying upon his state
of mind to distinguish the conduct from ordinary negligence. Just as
negligence is determined by an analysis of the probability of harm, the
severity of that harm, and the utility of the actor's conduct or the
burden of not engaging in the particular act,83 "recklessness" should
not an analysis of knowledge, but of the type of activity that should have provided
reasonable men with knowledge of the high degree of unreasonableness that their conduct
posed to others. Many employees attempt to circumvent the "intentional act" exclusion
to worker's compensation's exclusive remedy by alleging that conduct is "intentional"
when it involves only the "intentional" violation of some safety regulation or other
egregious conduct, but that clearly does not involve an "intent" to achieve consequences-
injure an employee. See cases cited in Johnson, Developments in the Law 1980-81, Workers'
Compensation, 42 La. L. Rev. 620 at 633-34 n.43 (1982). "Most of the cases presented
facts which could have constituted 'gross negligence' (whatever that means) rather than
'intentional' acts in the traditional definition." Id. at 630. Louisiana's "intentional act"
exception has withstood these attempts to place "gross negligence" outside of worker's
compensation immunity, but Professor Johnson would also classify the conduct in Bazley
as "basically an ordinary negligence case in which the court of appeal characterized the
conduct as 'intentional."' Id. at 630 n.36. Professor Johnson also provides that "substantial
certainty" is not an alternative to intent, but a method of proving it. Id. at 633. Other
states have defined similar "intentional" provisions to include "recklessness" because they
involve conduct so unreasonable that although not "intended" in traditional sense, for
policy reasons they should not be treated as accidents. See Note, Worker's Compensation:
Expanding the Intentional Tort Exception to Include Willful, Wanton, and Reckless
Employer Misconduct, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 890 (1983).
83. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 291-93 (1966).
19881
2LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
be subjected to the same analysis. "Recklessness," as opposed to mere
negligence, should be found when one or more of these factors is
exaggerated-the gravity of the conduct excessively outweighs the utility
of the conduct (or the burden of not doing the activity) or the probability
of injury is so great that it outweighs the utility of the conduct. Under
this approach, the actor's actual knowledge of the risk remains highly
relevant. As the actor's awareness of the risk of harm increases, the
"cost" of avoiding the harm decreases.
In performing this negligence-type balancing analysis, courts should
be careful not to place too much emphasis on any one factor. For
example, the chance of an accident occurring because a driver is in-
toxicated is minimal, yet the social value is so low that courts should
have little trouble calling it "reckless". 8 4 In such a case, the proper
inquiry is whether the cost, risk, and utility are such that the conduct
is grossly out of line with what is expected of a reasonable man.
However, the voluntary encounter of even a seriously unreasonable risk
should not by itself constitute "reckless" conduct. For example, a driver
who voluntarily drives at an excessive speed exposes to other drivers
the risk of serious bodily injury, just as a driver who drinks before
driving also "consciously" encounters a known risk. Yet neither driver
should be called "reckless" by these facts alone. Instead, the magnitude
of the particular risks and relative value of the conduct should be
examined by the factfinder in each instance, without the reassurance of
any test that must be satisfied before the conduct is called "reckless."
Just as in a negligence analysis, the actor's knowledge of the risk is a
factor that must be included in the analysis.
Application of the Proposal
The proposal developed in section three requires that a court identify
the type of conduct described by a particular statute, that is, determine
to which of the three tiers of misconduct the statute refers, and then,
assuming that the middle tier is signaled, examine the cost of avoiding
the harm, the severity and likelihood of the harm, and the social utility
of the actor's conduct to determine whether the conduct reaches this
intermediate zone. Critical in an analysis of social utility is a consid-
eration of the legislative policies and purposes underlying the particular
statute. This section will examine the three types of statutes at issue in
light of the proposal developed above.
84. See, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854 (1979).
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Immunity Statutes
Legislation includes four types of immunity statutes that provide an
upper limit of applicable conduct. These statutes provide limited im-
munity to board members of nonprofit organizations, 85 public entities
and their officers, 6 landowners who allow gratuitous access to their
lands for recreational purposes, 7 and certain other "volunteers," in-
cluding providers of gratuitous emergency care, 8 coaches and team
physicians,8 9 and coconut throwers aboard Mardi Gras floats. 9° Immunity
is also provided to owners of "farm land and forest land" for torts
against "unlawful entrants." 91
When faced with a statute containing one of these problem words,
courts should (1) determine which tier is described, and then (2) examine
the actor's conduct. The court in Rushing v. State92 examined the lan-
guage "deliberate and willful or malicious" and concluded that the use
of "malicious" was a signal that the conduct must fall within the
intermediate zone of conduct, defining "malicious" as an act done
"spitefully or wantonly." 93 This determination is in keeping with the
policies underlying the statute. 94 Once a level has been identified the
conduct must then be examined in light of the presumed policies that
the statute was designed to address. When performing an analysis of
the risk and utility of the actor's conduct, one should consider the
policy that is advanced by the statute in connection with the social
utility of the conduct and the knowledge of the actor in connection
with the cost of avoidance.
The policies promoted by statutes providing immunity to landowners
who allow public access for recreational purposes are identified easily.
85. La. R.S. 9:2792-2792.2 and 2792.4 (Supp. 1988) (conduct must be in good faith
and not "willful or wanton").
86. La. R.S. 9:2798.1 (Supp. 1988) (conduct must not be "acts or omissions which
constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or
flagrant misconduct").
87. La. R.S. 9:2791 (1965) (requires "deliberate and willful or malicious injury");
La. R.S. 9:2795 (Supp. 1988) (requires "willful or malicious failure to warn").
88. La. R.S. 9:2793 (Supp. 1988) (requires that injury be done "intentionally or by
grossly negligent acts").
89. La. R.S. 9:2798 (Supp. 1988) (requires "gross negligence").
90. La. R.S. 9:2796 (Supp. 1988) (requires a "deliberate and wanton act or gross
negligence").
91. La. R.S. 9:2800.4 (Supp. 1988) (requires "gross negligence").
92. 381 So. 2d 1250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980). See supra text accompanying notes
34-37.
93. Id. at 1253.
94. See Note, Liability of Landowner to Persons Entering for Recreational Purposes,
1964 Wis. L. Rev. 705, 711 (1964) ("willful or malicious failure to warn" should describe
gross negligence, but policies satisfied also with an "intentional" interpretation).
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The presumed purpose of these statutes is to encourage public access
to undeveloped land by relieving landowners of the duty generally owed
at common law to licensees, which includes persons given express or
implied permission to enter another's property. This includes the duty
to disclose any hazards on the land involving an unreasonable risk of
harm if the licensee would have had no reason to know of the condition
or appreciate its dangers. 95 The recreational use statutes are therefore
intended to relieve landowners of fear of liability in order to encourage
the opening of undeveloped lands for recreational purposes and so should
be aimed at providing landowners with immunity from the liability that
they ordinarily encounter.
Another important element of the risk-utility analysis is the actor's
knowledge of the risks he has exposed to others. This element is critical
because as the amount of knowledge possessed by the actor increases,
the cost of avoiding the accident decreases. At some point the degree
of unreasonableness becomes so exaggerated that the landowner's conduct
goes beyond that which the legislature sought to protect through the
statute. For example, if in Rushing catching frogs with a twelve foot
metal "gig" beneath a low power line was a highly foreseeable activity,
the determination that a failure to raise the line or post a warning was
conduct that falls within the twilight zone should not depend entirely
upon the actor's conscious disregard of the risk. Instead the burden of
avoiding the accident decreases with the amount of knowledge, and the
level of culpability increases.
Another statute protects public entities and their officers from li-
ability for injuries arising out of discretionary acts, unless those acts
can be described as "criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful,
outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct." 96 Despite the use of eight
adjectives, the statute provides courts with little guidance. Most of the
terms indicate an intent-fraudulent, intentional, and willful. But others
describe the intermediate level of conduct-criminal, malicious, outra-
geous, reckless, and flagrant. The legislature clearly intended to require
a showing of the intermediate level of conduct. The second part of the
proposal examines the actor's conduct. A factor which is critical in the
determination of whether conduct is in the intermediate level is the
policy that led to the passage of the statute in the first place. The policy
that underlies the statute granting immunity to public entities and their
officers is to provide such officers with a broad range of discretion in
the exercise of their duties. Therefore, the statute leaves public officials
95. Barret, Good Sports and Bad Lands: The Application of Washington's Recrea-
tional Use Statute Limiting Landowner Liability, 53 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1977).
96. La. R.S. 9:2798.1 (Supp. 1988).
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free to perform their duties quickly and efficiently, without fear of
liability for breaching a duty of reasonable care. In light of the strong
public policies underlying this statute courts should be sensitive to the
need to leave public officials with this broad range of discretion. Ar-
guably, then, the level of unreasonableness required before courts classify
conduct as "reckless" under this statute should be high.
An analysis of the first element of the interpretative approach pro-
posed here is not always necessary, however, for some statutes clearly
describe conduct within the middle "zone." Providers of gratuitous
emergency care, 97 farmers, 98 and certain state employees99 are provided
immunity unless their conduct is "intentional or gross[ly] negligen[t]."
This phrase shows clearly that conduct short of intentional, but more
serious than merely negligent, behavior will be sufficient to remove the
actor from the realm of liability provided by the statute. Determining
what general level of tortious conduct is contemplated, however, is only
the first step in the interpretation and application of the statutory
language. In order to determine whether the actions of a particular
defendant in fact amount to the prohibited middle tier conduct, the
court, as has been noted, must give careful attention to the defendant's
actual knowledge of the risk and to the degree of unreasonableness of
the conduct, that is, the extent to which the social utility of the conduct
is outweighed by its costs.
Consider, for example, the potential liability of a volunteer coach
who forces his athletes to practice their sport in the middle of a busy
street. Under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2798, volunteer coaches enjoy
immunity from suit by their athletes unless their conduct amounts to
"gross negligence." 100 With this statute, there is no question but that
the level of tortious conduct contemplated is somewhere within the middle
tier. The question then becomes whether the behavior of this particular
coach falls within that middle tier, and so, gives rise to liability. First,
the coach's state of mind must be considered. Reliance upon some
doctrinal test that focuses upon the consciousness of the coach would
really provide little guidance to the court in its task of classifying the
coach's conduct, for under such tests an actor's consciousness of the
risk is constructive, that is, it depends on what a reasonable person
would have been aware of. But the actual knowledge of this coach
would be extremely important in determining recklessness, regardless of
what a reasonable coach would have known. The burden or cost of
avoidance of the injury is extremely low when the actor has knowledge
97. La. R.S. 9:2793 (Supp. 1988).
98. La. R.S. 9:2800.4 (Supp. 1988).
99. La. R.S. 9:2798.1 (Supp. 1988).
100. La. R.S. 9:2798 (Supp. 1988).
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of the nature and seriousness of a particular risk. The risk-utility analysis
should also include as a factor the strong policy represented by the
statute-the encouragement of volunteer coaching. When placed within
the analysis this strong policy might require a larger degree of risk or
a lower cost of avoidance before the conduct is considered gross. Courts
should pay particular attention to the impact upon potential volunteers
when conduct is only slightly more serious than conduct which might
be considered ordinary negligence.
The interpretative approach proposed here might also be profitably
applied in construing Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2800.4, which extends
to owners of farm and timber land immunity from suit by unlawful
entrants unless the owners' conduct is "intentional" or "gross[ly] neg-
ligen[t]."'' The first question, again, is what general level or levels of
tortious conduct this language describes. The term "intentional" obvi-
ously refers to the first tier, while the term "gross negligence" presum-
ably refers to something less serious. Beyond that, however, the term
''gross negligence" cannot be defined with any greater precision; it merely
signals that the legislature contemplated conduct falling somewhere on
the broad range of misconduct that runs between ordinary negligence
and intentional tort.
Having made this determination, the next question becomes whether
the particular conduct at issue in the case at least satisfies the statute's
middle tier standard. Once again, the inquiry requires an examination
of the farm or timber landowner's knowledge of the condition that
resulted in the harm. But the analysis cannot stop there. The court must
also consider the degree of unreasonableness of the owner's act or failure
to act. In making this determination, the court must of 'course be
especially sensitive to the social utility of that act or failure to act and
to the policies that underlie the grant of immunity to farm and timber
landowners. The difficulty here is that it is not immediately apparent
what legitimate social policies are advanced by this grant of immunity.
That fact alone suggests that, in determining what level of misconduct
by'such landowners will amount to "gross negligence," the courts should
err on the side of liability, that is, set the "gross negligence" standard
only slightly above that of ordinary negligence. 0 2
101. La. R.S. 9:2800.4 (Supp. 1988).
102. The absence of any clear justification for the grant of immunity to owners of
farm and timber lands also raises the possibility that the statutes granting such immunity
are constitutionally defective. A constitutional analysis is beyond the scope of this comment,
but the argument should be similar to the equal protection arguments that have led to
the repeal of automobile guest statutes in all but a few states. The rationale for those
statutes is "hospitality protection," as the statutes apply to gratuitous guests, and pre-
venting possible collusion between driver and guest at loss to insurer. Both of these
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Solidary Liability
The legislature limited solidary liability to cases where actors "con-
spired" to commit an "intentional or willful act."103 The "willful act"
provision could indicate an intent by the legislature to provide plaintiff
with deep pockets recovery when conduct would not be considered
intentional. As was discussed previously, many common law courts
consider "willful" to be synonomous with "reckless." This would give
courts great flexibility, enabling them to allow solidary liability for any
conduct that reaches the intermediate level. However, the requirement
that the actors conspire could indicate a meaning synonymous with
intent. Because the legislature could have used many terms to indicate
conduct that is not intentional, and included a requirement that the
actors "conspire", courts should refrain from the temptation to assign
"willful" a non-intentional meaning.
Exemplary Damages
Exemplary damages are authorized in Louisiana for only two types
of conduct: conduct which involves a "wanton or reckless disregard for
the rights and safety of others by a defendant whose intoxication was
a cause in fact of the resulting. injuries"'' 04 and conduct which involves
a "wanton or reckless disregard for public safety in the storage, handling
or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances.' ' 15 Many jurisdictions
authorize punitive damages for any intentional or reckless conduct.Y°6
Among those jurisdictions most require similar conduct, although the
labels used to describe those standards differ widely and are a potential
source of confusion.107
Common law courts and commentators state that a "conscious
indifference to harmful consequences" is necessary to satisfy the policies
behind punitive or exemplary damages.100 Because punitive damages are
meant to deter highly culpable conduct of the defendant as well as of
other parties, and to punish this actor, "negligence," it is said, would
not satisfy the policies behind punitive damages.'0 9 Rather, there must
justifications were dismissed in Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 506
P.2d 212 (1973). See Green, "The Excitement of Change: A Dialogue on the Constitu-
tionality of the Guest Statute," 14 Creighton L.Rev. 37 (1980).
103. La. Civ. Code art. 2324.
104. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.4.
105. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.3.
106. See Annotation, Test or Criterion of Gross Negligence or Other Misconduct that
will Support Recovery of Exemplary Damages for Bodily Injury or Death Unintentionally
Inflicted, 98 A.L.R. 267, 268 (1935).
107. Id.
108. C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Damages, § 79, at 280-281 (1935).
109. Id.
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exist some positive element of conscious wrongdoing, either by showing
that the defendant acted with evil intent or that he was so wanton or
reckless as to disclose a conscious disregard of the rights of others. 10
But because courts do not require actual knowledge of the unreasonable
risk the actor has chosen to expose to others, the vacous language of
these tests really only disguises what courts must determine-whether
this defendant's conduct represents such a "gross deviation" from ac-
ceptable conduct that the conduct demands the serious consequences of
exemplary damages.
Unfortunately, the Louisiana courts that have so far considered the
exemplary damages statutes have shown no desire to part with these
common law tests. The court in Myres v. Nunsett stated that intoxication
by itself satisfies the requirements of "recklessness" under the tests that
most jurisdictions apply to the award of punitive damages, but then
proceeded to limit its analysis to cause in fact."' Likewise the court in
Levet v. Calais & Sons, Inc."2 provides no significant guidance. There
the court stated that "it need not be shown that he [the driver] was
drunk, but only that he had a sufficient quantity of intoxicants to make
him lose normal control of his mental and physical faculties."" ' 3 This
test-based approach, as it is submitted, is inadequate. Instead of relying
upon such broad statements courts should examine the conduct to de-
termine if it represents extremely unreasonable conduct.
The court should overtly examine the degree of unreasonableness
of the actor's conduct rather than rely upon the "conscious disregard"
test used by the common law. To do this, the court must carefully
consider the utility of the conduct, the magnitude of the risk, and the
cost of avoidance. Relevant to this last factor, and of particular sig-
nificance in the exemplary damages context, is the actor's knowledge
of risk. For example, the comsumption of a small amount of alcohol
before driving might not by itself be considered reckless, but if the actor
knew of his tendency to fall asleep even after consuming even small
doses of alcohol, then the evaluation of the burden of avoiding the
accident would be significantly affected. As the knowledge of a possible
accident increases, the burden of avoiding the accident decreases.
CONCLUSION
Whenever a court is faced with a statute that employs such terms
as "willful,'. "wanton," "reckless," or "gross negligence," it should
110. Id.
111. 511 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987). See supra text accompanying
notes 46-49.
112. 514 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987). See supra text accompanying notes 42-
45.
113. 514 So. 2d at 159.
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be careful not to place too much significance on these terms. The court
certainly should avoid efforts to assign these and other terms determinate
ranks on the scale of tortious conduct, for such efforts are bound to
end in frustration and confusion. At best these expressions are useful
only in determining into which of the three basic divisions, or tiers, of
misconduct the action contemplated by the legislature falls: (1) intentional
torts, (2) ordinary negligence, or (3) the broad range in between. Often,
which of these three levels the term signals will be clear. For example,
the phrase "intentional or willful" usually suggests a requirement that
there be an intent to injure, while such terms as "wanton" and "reck-
less" ordinarily point to the intermediate level of misconduct. In other
cases, however, the level intended by the legislature will not be clear.
The court must then give special attention to the history and purposes
of the legislation in determining what general level of misconduct was
contemplated.
If the court determines that the terms used signal the intermediate
tier of misconduct, as will usually be the case, it should then proceed
to consider whether the defendant's conduct is grossly in excess of what
is expected of reasonable men. In order to make this determination,
the court must undertake a negligence-type balancing analysis, an analysis
that focuses on the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude
of the risk, and the cost of avoiding the harm. Just as the court would
identify negligence without the use of any formal "test" that indicates
whether conduct is unreasonable, it should not rely on some abstract
reference point, such as the actor's "consciousness of" or "indifference
to" a risk in identifying "reckless" behavior. Such a standard provides
little guidance and only clouds the analysis that should be performed.
Edwin H. Byrd, III
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